THE DUTY OF A DIRECTOR PURCHASING SHARES OF STOCK by LAYLIN, CLARENCE D.
THE DUTY OF A DIRECTOR PURCHASING
SHARES OF STOCK
CLARENCE D. LAYLIN
Professor of Law, Ohio State University
It is true enough that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."1  Occasionally, however, one encounters a legal
problem to which the judicial reactions when guided only by intuitions
and prejudices have not been as nearly unanimous as they were, for
example, in support of the rule of Price v. Neal.2 Such a situation
seems to exist with respect to whether or not a director of a corpora-
tion for profit negotiating with a stockholder for the purchase of the
latter's shares owes him a duty to disclose, unsolicited, all material
facts bearing upon their value which the former may have learned
while a director.
Much has been written upon this theme3 Indeed, the state of the
legal literature of the subject precludes exhaustive analysis of the
cases.4 It may be stated, however, that those who have written have
affirmed the existence of the duty, and have put it upon the ground
that the director sustains a fiduciary relation to the individual stock-
holder with respect to the shares of the latter. Yet, the current of
1 Holmes, The Common Law, z.
2 (1762) 3 Burr. 1354; see Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (189) 4 HARV.
L. REV. 297; Lectures on Legal History, 27o; Wigmore, A Summary of Quasi-
Contracts (1891) 25 AM. LAw. REv. 695, 7o6; Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 154-8;
Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, ch. V.; U. S. Bank v. Bank of Georgia (1825) 1o
Wheat. 333, 355, per Mr. Justice Story; Dedham Nat. Bank v. Everett Nat. Bank
(19ol) 177 Mass. 392, 395, per Holmes, J. In this instance a perfectly well-
settled rule has puzzled courts and commentators alike in the effort to find an
analytical basis for it.
*W. W. Thornton, The Trust Relation between Corporate Officers and Stock-
holders Buying of, or Selling their Stock to Them (igo8) 67 CENT. L. JoUR. 452;
Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder
(igio) 8 MicH. L. REV. 267-elaborately reviewing the then extant cases; A. H.
Bigelow, The Relation of Directors of a Corporation to Individual Stockholders
(1915) 81 Cxr. L. Joui. 256; N. C. Collier, Liabilities of Directors and of
Trustees to Beneficial Owners Compared (1912) 74 CENT. L. Joua. 36o; I
Story, Equity Jurisp. (12th ed.) 225; 3 Thompson, Corporations, s. 4034;
Taylor, Private Corporations, 692, n.; Purdy's Beach, Private Corporations, s.
737 a; Elliott, Private Corporations, s. 5o2.
'To make such an analysis, except as to cases decided since I9lo and referred




actual adjudication shows that their efforts have not yet produced
more than a contrariety of judicial opinion.5
It is felt that, quite properly, perhaps, the proponents of the affirma-
tive have intuitively assumed the existence of the fiduciary relation in
question,6 and that the judges who have supported the negative, find-
ing that their intuitions were otherwise, have rejected it as a premise.7
To be sure, there has been some effort to support the affirmative by
means of principles to which further reference will be made. But
the impression of the writer is that the position has been assumed on
practical grounds, and rejected on like grounds; and that the support-
ing reasons have been props rather than foundations. However this
may be, it is quite evident that the reasons which have been adduced in
favor of the rule have- not been convincing to those in whose view the
'The existence of the fiduciary relation in question was denied in the follow-
ing cases decided since i91o: Bawden v. Taylor (1912) 254 Ill. 464, 98 N. E.
941; Bacon v. Soule (1912) ig Cal. App. 428, 126 Pac. 384; Steinfeld v. Nielsen
(914) 15 Ariz. 424, 139 Pac. 888, correcting, on rehearing (i9o9) 12 Ariz. 381,
ioo Pac. io94; Allen v.. Hyatt (1914, Jud. Com. Privy Council) i7 Dom. L. R. 7,
affirming 8 Dom. L. R. 79-special relation recognized; Gadsden v. Bennetto
(1912) 5 Dom. L. R. 529, reversed, 23 Manitoba, 33, 9 Dom. L. R. 719, on ground
of actual fraud; Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co. (1915) 132 Tenn. 210, 177 S. W. 479,
L. R. A. 1916 B, 7o6; Haverland v. Lane (i916) 89 Wash. 557, 154 Pac. ix8.
It was affirmed in Steinfeld v. Nielsen (original hearing) supra, Black v.
Simpson (913) 94 S. C. 312, 77 S. E. io23, semble; Dawson v. National Life
Ins. Co. (i916) 176 Iowa, 362, 157 N. W. 929, L. R. A. x916 E, 878; .Tacquith v.
Mason (i916) 99 Nebr. 5og, i56 N. W. io41.
"'The adoption of this rule is essential to check and stop the many frauds
[sic] that are daily perpetrated by corporate officers upon the stockholders of
their companies. Equity and gdod conscience require it." Thornton, op. cit. 67
CENT. L. JouI. 452, 457.
"That the director may take advantage of his position to secure the profits
that all have won, offends the moral sense; no sh'areholder expects to be so
treated by the director he selects; no director would urge his friends to select
him for that reason; that the law yet allows him to do this, does more to dis-
courage legitimate investment in corporate shares than almost anything else, and
allows the fiction of the corporate entity to obstruct instead of advance justice."
Wilgus, op. cit. MIcH. L. Rv. 267, 297.
"The debate as to whether technically a fiduciary relation exists may ... go
on, but a knowledge of the law is not required to enable one to appreciate the
moral wrong perpetrated by a corporate officer in profiting by the ignorance of
a stockholder by means of knowledge acquired by virtue of his position." Ladd,
J., in Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co. 176 Iowa, 362, 375.
'The following are believed to be fair examples of the expression of this view.
"It will not do to make the principle generally applicable to purchases by
directors of the stock of their corporations.
"As to stocks which have a... market value, parties generally sell and buy
them, with reference to this ... value...
"As to such stock, would it do to make the purchase of it by a director ... an
exception, and to say, that the parties dealt with reference to the real condition
of the corporation and the supposed real value of the stock, founded on a ...
supposed knowledge of its affairs? Plainly it would not; and plainly in such
case, the application of the principle of equity would be unreasonable." Suther-
land, J., in Carpenter v. Danforth (1868, N. Y.) 52 Barb. 58i, 586.
"The contrary view would place directors in a most invidious position, as they
could not buy or sell shares without disclosing negotiations [to sell the under-
taking], a premature disclosure of which might well be against the best interests
of the company." Swinfen Eady, J., in Percival v. Wright [I9o2] 2 Ch. 421, 426.
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practical aspects of the problem have suggested a negative answer. In
this state of affairs it seems appropriate to apply analytical methods to
the question and, though conscious of an intuitive preference for the
affirmative rule, to endeavor to support that rule by reasons which may
at least make the opposite result more difficult. A principle that is
vindicated by logic is on that account more likely of acceptance than
one which stands upon "felt necessities" alone-especially when all do
not "feel" alike.
Is a director actually sub modo a trustee for each individual stock-
holder with respect to the latter's shares-? It is submitted that the
capacity of the stockholder to sue the directors in a proper case and,
subject to certain restrictions, to restrain or redress a wrong against
the corporation which incidentally affects the value of his shares" does
not establish such a relation. For in such cases his interests are
derivative-he suffers through the corporationf while here the
director's conduct does not affect the corporate assets in any way.
Again, in those cases, all stockholders suffer alike; in these, none but
the vendor of the shares can complain. So far, then, naught is estab-
lished beyond obligations of the director to the corporation as such,
that may be enforced by a single stockholder.
Is it, then, correct to assert at this point (as many have done) that
the corporate personality-fictional or real, as one pleases-should be
disregarded, and that the fiduciary relation which is admitted to exist
between the directors and the corporation should as a result inure to
the benefit of the individual stockholders, as the human beings screened
behind the artificial entity?10
It is believed that the solution of the problem must ultimately be
worked out by disregarding the corporate "fiction ;" but this particular
application of the expedient is doubted. In the first place, it brings us
no further on the way than to show that the director's agency which,
as between him and the corporation, constitutes the particular fiduciary
relation now sought to be extended to the stockholders,11 exists in rela-
'Robinson v. Smith (1832, N. Y.) 3 Paige, 222; Scott v. De Peyster (1832, N.
Y.) i Edw. 513; Hodges v. New England Screw Co. (i85o) i R. I. 312; Dodge
v. Woolsey (855, N. Y.) 18 How. 331.
' See discussion of this point in Commissioners of Tippecanoe Co. v. Reynolds
(873) 44 Ind. 509, 516 et seq. This decision-a leading case on its side of the
question-has been justly criticized; but the particular reasoning of Worden, J.,
therein, now referred to, is believed to be sound.
" Walshant v. Stainton (1863) 1 De G. J. & S. 678; Oliver v. Oliver (1903)
II8 Ga. 362, 367; Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., supra.
"The inherently abstract idea of an artificial personality in the modern idea
of a corporation, seems to form the ground of all this difficulty." Bigelow, op.
cit. 8 CENT. L. Jouw. 256, 26r. See excerpt from Professor Wilgus' article
supra, n. 6; also passages quoted post, n. 12.
'uDawson v. National Life Ins. Co. 176 Iowa, 362, 387; Von Au v. Magen-
heimer (I9o8) 126 N. Y. App. Div. 257; Walsham v. Stainton, supra.
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tion to the whole body of the stockholders. The agent's real principal,
if the juristic person be ignored, is a collection of individuals. This
objection has apparently been felt by some supporters of the rule under
discussion, and they seem to urge in reply that the emerging collection
of individuals may be treated as a partnership, or at the least as a joint
undertaking. So treating the association, its affairs are found to be
controlled by a few managers who sustain fiduciary relations to each
individual associate.
12
In the second place, however, the- opponents of the rule have asserted
that it is not enough to show a fiduciary relation as between the
individual stockholders and the directors, but that it must also appear
that the relation exists with respect to the shares owned by the former
and that this is not the case. 13 In other words, they say that the confi-
dence reposed by the stockholders in the directors relates to the
management of the business of the association and not to the separate
affairs of particular members of it. If this point is sound, its validity
as an objection to the rule is open to argument, but the expediency of
questioning its soundness, if by such means it can be obviated, would
seem to be apparent.
The two objections which have been mentioned are those usually put
forward in opposition to the rule. It is believed, however, that there is
another possible objection. The established principle is that the
' See the cases cited supra, n. II; Oliver v. Oliver, supra; Wilgus, op. cit.
Micn. L. REv.
"Whether the corporation be treated as an enlarged and amplified form of
partnership and the director as managing partner, or whether he is called an
agent or trustee elected by the stockholders to represent them in the manage-
ment of the concern, he occupies a fiduciary position . " Lamar, J., in Oliver
v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 369.
"The fiduciary obligation is to the stockholders in a body. Why not to the
component parts represented by the shares?
"Pad that imaginary legal entity known as the corporation been regarded for
the moment merely as an association of individuals investing different sums in
a common enterprise, with the design of accomplishing specified purposes
through those selected as directors, it would not have been so difficult to have
understood the relation of confidence existing between director and shareholder."
Ladd, J., in Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co" 176 Iowa, 362, 376, 390, supra.
' This seems to be the real or ultimate ground of decision in Carpenter v. Dan-
forth, 52 Barb. 581, supra, and Commissioners v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 5o9, supra;-
the leading cases.
"There is, therefore, a certain trust relation between the shareholders and the
directors of a corporation; but the trust put in the directors usually extends,
and I must assume that in this case it extended only to the management of the
general affairs of the corporation, with a view to dividends of profits ... The
directors are not trustees for the sale of the stock of the corporation ... I
think it will be found, in most of the cases referred to by the counsel, that it
appeared, or that it was assumed, that the trust, or trust relation, extended to
the subject of the dealing, or contract in question .... I think that the sale or
transaction, or its subject, is not so far connected with, or the subject of th&
trust, or trust relation which is admitted to exist, as to subject the director to
... the principle of equity... " Sutherland, J., in Carpenter v. Danforth, 52
Barb. 581, 584-6. Italics are the present writer's. See similar remarks of
Worden, J., in Commissioners v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 516.
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existence of the corporation as a distinct entity is not to be ignored
unless some paramount policy requires, or unless unconscionable results
will follow its recognition in a particular case."4 The prevention of
actual fraud is, of course, good ground for disregarding the corporate
entity."5 But to do so on the principles thus far developed is to furnish
a predicate for constructive fraud. This seems to be at least an excep-
tional use of the expedient of ignoring the corporate fiction.1 6  It is
believed that the reasons for disregarding the corporate personality
must exist independently; they must be actually present, concealed
only by the corporate screen, so that its removal will reveal them. In
the present case the removal of the screen results in creation rather
than revelation.
It is believed that the true reason for the rule under discussion may
be discovered without turning the corporation into a quasi-partnership,
and in the first instance, without looking behind or through the cor-
porate entity, but rather by looking directly at the corporate organiza-
tion as it actually exists. The opposing arguments which have been
mentioned have premised the proposition that a director is an agent.Y
This proposition is inaccurate and in a sense untrue. Powers, duties
and liabilities like those of an agent are cast upon the board of directors,
it is true; but in almost all instances this devolution is the result of the
important fact that directors are officers.
An officer is not merely one kind of agent or trustee. His repre-
sentative authority is irrecusable-it springs from the law itself; the
1
"Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A. C. 22; Jackson v. Hooper (1gog)
16 N. J. Eq. 592; U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrig. Trans. Co. (1905) 142 Fed. 247;
Bank v. Trebein (1898) 59 Ohio St. 316; State v. Standard Oil Co. (1892) 49
Ohio St 137; People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co. (189o) 121 N. Y. 582.
Deference to the "fiction theory" would perhaps dictate another phrasing of the
rule, such s that set forth in the opinion of Minshall, J., in State v. Standard
Oil Co.:
"The general proposition that a corporation is to be regarded as a legal entity
... is a mere fiction, existing only in idea.... It has been introduced for the
convenience of the company ... but where it is urged to an end subversive ofits policy, or such is the issue, the fiction must be ignored ..... " 49 Ohio St.
137, 177, ,79.
As to the fundamental nature of a corporation, see the article by Professor
Wesley N. Hohfeld on Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corpo-
ration Debts (igog) 9 COLUmBrA L. Rxv. 285, footnote 289-290.
Whether we say that the entity is to be regarded unless reasons for ignoring
it appear, or that it is to be ignored unless the facts show occasion for its use as
a legal fiction, the question as to what shall be the occasion for its use or its
rejection remains open.
' U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrig. Trans. Co. 142 Fed. 247, supra; Bank v. Trebein,
59 Ohio St 316, supra; Brundred v. Rice (892) 49 Ohio St 540; Montgomery
Web Co. v. Deinelt (i89o) 133 Pa. St 585; Linn Timber Co. v. U. S. (1915)
236 U. S. 574.1 Cf. Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A. C. 22, supra.
1 See supra, notes 11, 12 and 13.
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powers of the agent or trustee are consensual. The agent is his
principal's alter ego within the scope of his authority; the officer is,
in reality, the principal itself, pro hac vice. The officer, whether public
or corporate, is one in whom the law vests power to determine the
public or corporate action in an independent capacity 18
An office is a thing of which legal title can be predicated.1 9 Not so
with an agency. Not so, either, with a trusteeship, which results from
a qualified legal title, but is not itself a subject of title. Aside from the
mere name, what, then, is there of substance in an office that it should
be capable of being held in possession and susceptible to a right to pos-
session? Manifestly, no more than a group of inherent and inde-
pendent powers.20 These, however, vest in the officer for the benefit
of others, not for his own benefit. Accordingly, the officer is in a real
sense a trustee of his official powers.
21
The trust relation thus established is to be sure an imperfect one. It
lays the foundation of few if any rights cognizable in a court of equity
and hence it may at once be conceded to lack the essential charac-
teristics of* a technical trust. But it is a trust sub modo and it satis-
fies every element of a perfect trust save one.
The identity of the cestui que trustent sub modo of the powers of the
directors of a private corporation depends upon the particular power
in question. In many, perhaps most instances, the corporate "person"
itself is regarded as the one to which the obligation is due.22 In several
if not all of these instances, it is believed that the prevailing conception
is inaccurate save in a qualified sense. We need not stop to consider
the general question thus suggested in all its broader aspects; a single
power will suffice for present purposes. Let us take the power to
declare dividends. It is certainly not to be exercised for the benefit of
'Hoyt v. Thompson (1859) ig N. Y. 207, 216, per Comstock, J.; People v.
Powell (1911) 2o1 N. Y. 194; Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore
(i88o) 6o N. H. 85; Automatic Self-Cleaning Filter Co. v. Cunninghame [igo6]
2 Ch. 34. See article by W. P. Rogers, Corporations (1915) 6o OHio L. Buu.
2or, 47 CHic. L. NEws, 382.
1 While no modern American case has been found which expressly establishes
this point, those involving questions of extraordinary remedies are full of such
expressions as "the question of title to an office" and "possession of an office."
See People v. Police Commissioners (I9O3) 174 N. Y. 450, the reasoning in which
is applied to the case of a director of a private corporation in People v. Powell,
2Ol N. Y. 194, supra. It is believed that, in the sense in which the terms "title"
and "possession" are herein used, their employment in such connections is correct
Opinion of the Judges (1822, Me.) 3 Greenl. 481; Matter of Hathaway
(1877) 71 N. Y. 238, 243; 2 Bl. Com. 36.
'"It appears that, of the various powers which are given to them [directors]
they are, in the strictest sense, trustees." Anon., The Fiduciary Position of
Directors, 8o L. T. 299, 300. Italics are the present writer's.
" See supra, notes 8, 12 and 13. The cases declaring the existence of a trust
relation between the directors and the corporation as such are, of course,
numerous.
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the corporation as a distinct person, for when a dividend is once
declared the corporation owes it to the entitled stockholders in
severalty.23  In this situation the corporation cannot be thought of as
a fiction representing the associated members. Suppose we disregard
the corporate personality: what human beings are behind the screen
when the corporation is subject to suit for dividends? It cannot be the
stockholders, for they are the potential plaintiffs, and it would not do to
say that they are about to sue themselves. Is it not the directors, who
are the real persons in default? Indeed, it is believed to be a sound
principle that whenever corporate conduct is in question and the charac-
ter of the management and control of a corporation is consequently
drawn in issue, the human beings discovered behind the fiction of cor-
porate personality are more likely to be the managers than the
members.24  It has frequently been somewhat carelessly assumed that
to ignore the fiction means to recognize the stockholders as the real
parties in interest; but obviously this is not always true, and the most
recent cases recognize the exceptions.
If the power to declare dividends is not to be exercised for the benefit
of the corporation it must exist for the benefit of the stockholders; and
.inasmuch as they do not appear here as the constitutents of the juristic
person who is their theoretical adversary, they must be cestuis que
trustent sub modo in their several and individual capacities. There-
fore, in at least this one instance, the directors are fiduciaries of the
individual stockholders.
Of course the power under discussion is discretionary and save in
exceptional cases its exercise cannot be controlled by compulsory pro-
cess.
25 Yet at the least, the income of the corporation and the enhance-
"Hence the rule that dividends belong to the owner of the share at the time
they are declared. Cates v. Consolidated Realty Co. (1914) 25 Cal. App. 531, 144
Pac. 3oi; Redhead v. Iowa Nat. Bank (i9o5) 127 Iowa, 572, 1o3 N. W. 796;
Price v. Morning Star Mining Co. (19oo) 83 Mo. App. 470; Tepfer v. Ideal Gas
& Elec. Fix. Co. (19o8) 58 Misc. 396, iog N. Y. Supp. 664; Wallin v. Johnsori
City Lumber & Mfg. Co. (i916, Tenn.) i88 S. W. 577, L. I. A. 1917 B, 325. The
fixation of the identity of those who are entitled to dividends as of a certain date
demonstrates that their rights are several, and not enjoyed as members of the
corporate body. Indeed, they are creditors of the corporation. Beers v. Bridge-
port Spring Co. (875) 42 Conn. 17; King v. Paterson I. H. R. R. Co. (86xi) 29
N. J. L. 304. Cf. Ford v. Easthampton Rubber Thread Co. (1893) 158 Mass.
84; McLaran v. Crescent Planing Mill Co. (i9o6) 117 Mo. App. 49.
2See Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. [I916] 2 A. C. 307, 340,
per Lord Parker of Waddington; Fritz Schulz Co. v. Rainier (1917) 166 N. Y.
Supp. 567; Purchase v. Atlantic Safe Deposit Co. (913) 81 N. J. Eq. 344, 346;
Wilson v. U. S. (IgII) 221 U. S. 361, 376.
'Pratt v. Pratt, Reed & Co. (I866) 33 Conn. 466; Williams v. Telegraph Co.
(x883) 93 N. Y. 162; McNab v. McNab & Harlin Mfg. Co. (i8gi, N. Y.) 62
Hun, i8. Cf. Scott v. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. (1838, N. Y.) 7 Paige, 203; Crichton
v. Webb Press Co. (i9o4) 113 La. 167; Blanchard v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1911)
78 N. J. Eq. 471.
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ment of the value of its property beyond the aggregate par value of
its- shares, constitute assets which the directors can turn into only a
limited number of possible channels. Dividends; surplus and reserve;
extensions, betterments and advertising: these are the options which
are offered. The choice of the first results in direct pecuniary benefit
to stockholders as individuals; that of the second adds to the funds of
the corporation as such, and if that entity be diregarded, to the assets
of the stockholders as a body, and so-at least indirectly-to the value
of all the shares and of each of them representing interests in the cor-
porate assets; that of the third makes an investment of funds that
might otherwise have been distributed among the stockholders, with
a view to larger distributions in the future. Such a power of umpirage
between the stockholders as distributees and the same persons as sub-
stantial co-owners would seem, clearly enough, to be one in which the
latter as individuals have a beneficial interest.26 Even if we regard the
individual stockholder as distinct from all the stockholders as a body,
we arrive at the same result; for a trustee of powers which may be
exercised for the benefit of either of two is a fiduciary as to both.2 7
The relation thus established is one which affects the shares belong-
ing to the stockholder. Indeed, his investment has been made upon the
faith of the beneficial exercise of the power. Many statutes use the
phrase "for profit" or its equivalent to distinguish business companies
from charitable corporations. The real meaning of such words is sug-
gested by the paraphrase "for the purpose of securing dividends to its
stockholders;" for the power to distribute profits, rather. than the
capacity to reap them, is the distinguishing characteristic of a business
company.28 Hence it appears that the securing of profits to the stock-
holders as investors is in law as well as in common understanding of
the essence of the corporate purpose. Manifestly, also, it is an essen-
tial element in the concept of property involved in a share of stock.29
Therefore the fiduciary relation between the directors and the
individual stockholders, growing out of the official powers of the
former, is one that exists in respect of the shares of the latter.
""The directors and managing officers occupy the position of quasi trustees
towards the stockholders . . . with respect to their shares of stock. Since the
stockholders own these shares, and since the value thereof and all their rights
connected therewith, are affected by the conduct of the directors, a trust relation
plainly exists between the stockholders and the directors, which is concerned
with and confined to the shares of stock held by the stockholders. . . ." 3
Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. (3d ed.) s. xo9o; cited with approval in Oliver v. Oliver,
1i8 Ga. 362, and in Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co. 176 Iowa, 362, 378.
'E. g., the situation of a trustee when the equitable estate is divided between
a tenant for life and a remainderman. See Perry,'Trusts, ch. XVIII.
"See Clark & Marshall, Private Corporations, s. 33; Snyder v. Chamber of
Commerce (895) 53 Ohio St. i.
'Angell & Ames, Corporations, s. 557; Taylor, Private Corporations, s. 567.
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It is unnecessary to look further, for with this point granted, the
duty to disclose follows upon easily applied principles. It is believed
that similar fiduciary relations might be established as growing out of
other powers of the directors, or as following upon principles slightly
different from the power to direct the application of the profits. The
method of approach which has been employed is chosen because it
seems to offer the most obvious demonstration of the character of the
relations between stockholders and directors, rather than with the
thought that it is the only one available.
The assumption seems correct that some such fiduciary relation must
be established in order to support the rule that the director must dis-
close facts known to him which affect the value of the shares when
negotiating with a stockholder for their purchase. Without it, there
would be no more foundation for the duty to disclose unsolicited infor-
mation to a stockholder than there would be for such a duty on the
part of a director selling his own shares to an outsider. If a seller
understands that the buyer is in a position to know more about the
value of the subject of sale than he does, there is nothing morally or
' It is believed that the reasoning of the cases which reject the rule contended
for goes astray at this point. S~e supra, n. 13.
"The directors of a corporation stand in a relation similar to that of trustees
for the shareholders .... Their action affects the whole body of shareholders,
beneficially or injuriously, in respect to dividends upon, or the value of, their
stock
"But stock in a corporation held by an individual is his own private property
... over which neither the corporation nor its officers have any control....
Worden, J., in Commissioners v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 5o6, 514, 515.
It would seem that the leading decisions concede the principle that if a
fiduciary relation exists, either (i) respecting the sale itself or (2) respecting
the subject of the sale, the trustee is required to make disclosure; and that they
effectively dispose of the first point by demonstrating that the relation between
directors and stockholders does not concern the actual transaction of selling
shares; but that they do not deal with the bearing of the fiduciary relation upon
the shares themselves as the subject of the transaction.
On the other hand, the opinion of Lamar, J., in Oliver v. Oliver, supra, seems
to place the stress where it belongs, and while not pursuing the analysis to the
degree attempted in this paper, appears convincing upon the point now under
consideration:
"If, then, any sort of trustees, they are necessarily subject to the obligations
and restrictions which inhere in that relation, as to any property entrusted to
them .... How is it possible in principle to draw the line and say that while
trustee for some purposes, he is not for others immediately connected there-
with?" 118 Ga. 362, 369, 370.
The following, from the opinion of Ladd, J., in Dawson v. National Life Ins.
Co., supra, is also suggestive of correct principles:
"Though the stockholders have no legal title to the property,... their shares
represent integral parts of the whole, the proportional shares of the dividend
declared or to be declared, and of the net assets upon dissolution .... To say,
then, that a director . . . owes nothing to the shareholders, as such, is in effect
declaring that, though acting as trustee of the entity, he is under no obligation
with respect to its component parts. . . ." 176 Iowa, 362, 377.
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legally wrong, according to present-day standards, in laying upon him
the burden of making inquiry of the buyer, and in declaring that he
assumes the risk involved in his own silence. The only element that
can change the result is the existence of a fiduciary relation. It is
hoped that the considerations which have been presented will at least
be suggestive of reasons which may be employed to meet the apparent
demand for an analytical basis for such a relation, and thereby to vindi-
cate and secure adoption for the rule which grows out of it.
